Beyond Taiwan: Europe Also Faces Challenges from Authoritarian Influence
From left to right: Oliver Dieckmann, Moderator (JTI); Angela Köckritz, China.Table; Anne Renzenbrink, Reporters Without Borders; Estelle Huang, European Council on Foreign Relations.
It is undisputed that China asserts territorial claims over Taiwan and ultimately intends to bring the island under its control. However, a military invasion would be risky, costly, and fraught with losses. For that reason, Beijing also pursues a more subtle and significantly cheaper strategy: destabilizing Taiwan from within through disinformation campaigns and international media strategies, sowing uncertainty among its population, and deterring international allies. The goal is to pressure Taiwan into voluntary submission. This approach is embedded in the People’s Republic’s military doctrine under the term cognitive warfare (認知戰爭).
But Taiwan is not the only target of disinformation. Europe, too, is increasingly in the crosshairs of authoritarian influence operations – not only from Russia but also, and more and more, from China. Unlike Russia’s more visible efforts, China’s information operations tend to be more covert. Yet in a crisis, such as a naval blockade or invasion of Taiwan, they could fully unleash their manipulative potential. This makes it all the more urgent to raise public awareness and openly discuss how democratic societies can respond to such threats. Europe has much to learn from Taiwan in this regard, no matter which authoritarian regime the disinformation comes from.
On July 10, 2025, we therefore hosted a panel discussion in the cultural hall of the Taipei Representative Office in Berlin. Under the title “China’s International Media Strategy: Disinformation, Propaganda, and Global Influence”, we discussed in a nearly fully occupied hall the current tactics of Chinese influence operations – ranging from new platforms like TikTok and Deepseek to partnerships with traditional Western media outlets. We were fortunate to have three excellent panellists: Estelle Huang, Visiting Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and longtime analyst for the Taiwanese government; Anne Renzenbrink, journalist and Asia expert at Reporters Without Borders; and Angela Köckritz, chief reporter at China.Table.
Where China’s Media Strategies Become Visible in Europe
One clear tactic of Chinese influence is the so-called “Borrowing Boat” strategy (借船出海): the Chinese propaganda apparatus uses Western media outlets as platforms to distribute its own content. In recent years, supplements titled “China Watch”—produced by the state-run news agency Xinhua—have regularly appeared in major German newspapers such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Handelsblatt, and Süddeutsche Zeitung. According to The Guardian, such inserts have been published in over 30 prestigious newspapers worldwide.
While these publications are formally labeled as Chinese content, public awareness of their political steering remains low outside expert circles. China is an authoritarian, Leninist one-party state, where President Xi Jinping demands absolute loyalty from media professionals. According to Reporters Without Borders, China ranks among the most repressive countries worldwide when it comes to press freedom – currently 178th out of 180. At least 113 journalists are imprisoned there, many under inhumane conditions.
Against this backdrop, it is highly problematic to distribute Chinese state propaganda alongside independent media. Even when labeled as such, their placement lends them a false sense of legitimacy through blurring the line between independent journalism and authoritarian influence.
Goals of Chinese Disinformation Campaigns Regarding Taiwan
China’s international media strategy pursues several political goals. Beyond seeking positive self-promotion, it primarily aims to unsettle or discourage Taiwan’s international supporters. At the same time, Beijing seeks to undermine public trust in Taiwan’s own government by tapping into existing societal tensions and uncertainties.
One narrative spread by Chinese actors is known as “yi Mei lun” (疑美論) – the deliberate propagation of the idea that the U.S. would abandon Taiwan in case of a contingency. Such messaging is designed to sow or deepen doubt and weaken Taiwan’s societal resilience.
Yet Taiwan is far from defenseless: civil society initiatives respond with credible fact-checking to circulating falsehoods and proactively provide the public with verified, easy-to-understand counter-narratives. Additionally, people in Taiwan use AI to combat Chinese media campaigns. For example, civil society actors use AI to detect fake accounts or suspicious activity such as astroturfing. One civil society organization at the forefront of these efforts is Taiwan AI Labs.
Chinese Disinformation Beyond the Chinese Language
Chinese platforms like Deepseek and TikTok are increasingly integrated into the daily lives of Europeans. While they may feature harmless dance videos, other videos promote narratives aligned with the Chinese Communist Party’s strategic interests. TikTok, for instance, may contain videos about internment camps in Xinjiang, but these are often followed by clips that downplay the issue, such as footage of smiling Uyghurs dancing in supposedly voluntary vocational centers. The real danger of these platforms lies in their potential to shape opinion during a Taiwan Strait crisis, as algorithms can be controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.
China is also acquiring or expanding media outlets, especially in the Global South. The Chinese company StarTimes, for example, now operates over 630 TV channels in more than 10 languages, primarily targeting African audiences. These undercut Western competitors in price, which enables them to gain a foothold in several regions. For many African areas, research has shown that Chinese-owned broadcasters have contributed to a more favorable perception of China.
Furthermore, Chinese content often doesn’t appear overtly political; instead, it’s simply distracting. Thus, in a sense, China’s international media strategy consists of what some term “chicken soup for the mind” – feel-good content meant to divert attention from critical information.
Impulses for Addressing Disinformation
Dealing with disinformation can feel daunting, but there are concrete ways to deal with them.
First, political responses are needed to address how digital platforms function. This includes action against opaque algorithms and the systematic spread of disinformation through fake accounts. Germany has historically been hesitant to intervene in public discourse, but given online death threats and large-scale disinformation campaigns, platform operators must be held accountable.
Second, we should consider creating new types of platforms. Taiwan’s former digital minister Audrey Tang coined the term “antisocial media” to describe the toxic dynamics of today’s platforms. So why not promote platforms that prioritize participation, dialogue, and community, rather than polarization, outrage, and rewarding the loudest voices?
Third, everyone can take action in their private lives – by using language and calling out some cases of inappropriate wording. For example, referring to the Tiananmen Square massacre as a mere “incident” downplays state violence. It was a bloody suppression of peaceful protests and should be named as such.
A fourth impulse concerns the protection of journalists – especially foreign media professionals working in Germany. Intimidation attempts by authoritarian states must not be tolerated. Safeguarding independent reporting must be a political priority.
Additionally, targeted public investment is needed in digital education, media literacy, and fact-checking. Education is not a side issue but a cornerstone of democratic resilience.
Finally, this is a key area where cooperation with Taiwan holds enormous potential. Whether through civil society initiatives, city partnerships, or EU programs: Taiwan has valuable experience in countering digital influence operations. We don’t need to copy Taiwan, but we should observe closely, and learn.
Special thanks to all attendees and our three panelists!
